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Abstract
We examined maltreated and nonmaltreated children’s (6- to 12-year-olds) ability to inhibit true
and false memories for neutral and emotional information using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott
(DRM) paradigm. Children studied either emotional or neutral DRM lists in a control condition or
were given directed-remembering or directed-forgetting instructions. The findings indicated that
children, regardless of age and maltreatment status, could inhibit the output of true and false
emotional information, although they did so less effectively than when they were inhibiting the
output of neutral material.  Verbal IQ was related to memory, but dissociative symptoms were not
related to children’s recollective ability. These findings add to the growing literature that shows
more similarities among, than differences between, maltreated and nonmaltreated children’s basic
memory processes.
Key Words:  False memories, DRM illusion, Maltreated children’s memory, Memory
development.
Can Maltreated Children Inhibit True and False Memories for Emotional Information?
Theoreticians, scientists, clinicians, and policy makers continue to debate whether basic
memory processes operate differently in maltreated and nonmaltreated children.  On the surface,
there are many reasons why maltreatment might be expected to alter basic memory processes
(Howe, Cicchetti, & Toth, 2006a; Howe, Toth, & Cicchetti, 2006b).  For example, child abuse
and neglect are highly stressful experiences that may lead to (1) physiological changes that can
affect the neural mechanisms related to memory storage (e.g., Bremner, 2008; Navalta, Tomoda,
& Teicher, 2008), (2) socioemotional consequences that include the development of insecure,
often disorganized, attachment relationships (e.g., Carlson, Cicchetti, Barnett, & Braunwald,
1989) and deviations in symbolic and representational abilities that may affect the encoding and
subsequent processing of memories (e.g., Lynch & Cicchetti, 1998; Rieder & Cicchetti, 1989;
Toth, Cicchetti, Macfie, Rogosch, & Maughan, 2000), (3) distortions in encoding and subsequent
processing of memories may also arise given failures in caregiving that can lead maltreated
children either to distort or dissociate memories associated with their abusive and neglectful
experiences (e.g., Cicchetti & Valentino, 2006), and (4) psychopathological consequences –
maltreated children are at heightened risk for the development of trauma-related psychopathology,
including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and dissociation, that may contribute to deficits
in memory performance (for a review, see Howe et al., 2006a, 2006b).
            Unfortunately, much of the speculation regarding the adverse consequences of child
maltreatment has emanated from clinical contexts and has not been subjected to rigorous
empirical testing.  For example, in her discussion of child abuse Herman (1992) authoritatively
states “The child’s distress symptoms are not generally recognized.  Altered states of
consciousness, memory lapses, and other dissociative symptoms are not generally recognized.” (p.
110).  Such sweeping statements regarding the effects of maltreatment on memory processes
historically have been assumed to be true in the absence of any data derived from
methodologically rigorous research contexts.  Given the extensive policy implications of
assumptions about the effects of maltreatment on memory for legal contexts involving child
testimony, the conduct of translational research on trauma and memory is particularly important.
 A review of the relatively sparse literature on child maltreatment and memory reveals
that the experience of child abuse and neglect does not change the operation of memory from that
observed in nonmaltreated children (Howe et al., 2006a, 2006b).  For example, investigations of
maltreated children’s memory for eyewitnessed events or their susceptibility to misinformation
and suggestion have revealed differences only when psychopathology also has been present
(Eisen, Goodman, Qin, Davis, & Crayton, 2007; Howe et al., 2006a, 2006b).  Speculation exists
that memories may be adversely affected as a result of stress and dissociation.  Although research
conducted on adults with histories of trauma have demonstrated associations between memory
impairments and dissociation (Goodman, Bottoms, Rudy, Davis, & Schwartz-Kenney, 2001;
Putnam, 2000), studies with children have not revealed such associations.  In fact, investigations
of maltreated children have shown that the presence of dissociative symptoms is related to more,
not less, detailed memories of abuse (Eisen, Qin, Goodman, & Davis, 2002).  Indeed, Eisen et al.
(2002) found that it was age that was the major predictor of children’s memory performance, not
abuse status, and that maltreated children were no more likely to be misled than nonmaltreated
children.  Moreover, individual differences in psychopathology, intelligence, or dissociation did
not predict memory errors or suggestibility rates.  Given the discrepancies between the adult and
child literatures and in view of the limited number of investigations of maltreatment, dissociation,
and memory with children, further research is needed.
            Questions about whether maltreated and nonmaltreated children differ in their memory
accuracy concerns more than just suggestibility.  Because memory is reconstructive, it is prone to
error, and includes errors of omission (forgetting something that happened) as well as errors of
commission (“remembering” something that did not happen).  Although maltreated children may
at times exhibit fewer errors of omission than other children, at least when it comes to
autobiographical recollection of abuse experiences, the question is also whether they vary in their
susceptibility to false memory illusions.  Recent investigations into the development of
spontaneous (as opposed to implanted or suggested) false memories have focused on the
Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).
Here, children are presented with lists of related words (e.g., doze, nap, dream, pillow, bed) that
are all associated with an unpresented word, the critical lure (e.g., sleep).  Later, when asked to
recall or recognize the words that had been presented, children will not only remember many of
the presented words but will also falsely remember the unpresented critical lure (e.g., Howe, 2006,
2008).  Developmentally, older children and adults are more susceptible to spontaneous false
memory illusions than younger children (for a review, see Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008a).  That
is, older children are more susceptible to the “illusory belief” that these unpresented but related
items were actually part of the presented materials.
           There are two main theoretical explanations of these developmental trends, fuzzy-
trace theory (FTT; Brainerd et al., 2008a) and associative-activation theory (AAT: Howe,
Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009).  In FTT, children are said to extract two very
different types of memory traces, a verbatim trace that encodes surface features of the
presented material (e.g., orthographic features) and a gist trace that encodes the
meaning or theme of what has been presented.  False memories occur when verbatim
traces fade (which they do more rapidly than gist traces) and recollection relies primarily
on gist traces.  Older children and adults are more susceptible to false memory illusions
than younger children because they are better at extracting the gist of the list.
           AAT relies on a single, integrated memory trace, one that incorporates both
surface and meaning characteristics in the same, distributed memory representation.
Like activation-monitoring theory (AMT; Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001) that has been
proposed to account for false memories in adults, AAT relies on a spreading activation
mechanism to account for false memories.  As concepts become active in memory
through their presentation, other, related concepts are activated through their
interconnections in an associative network.  Associations consist of many different
semantic relations including antonymy (e.g., black-white), entity (i.e., one term is an entity,
dog, and another is a property of that entity, fur), introspection (i.e., one concept refers to a mental
state, depressed, and another is a property related to that state, low energy), situational (i.e.,
concepts referring to the same situation, e.g., things to do with hospitals, nurses, surgery),
synonymy (e.g., couch-sofa), and taxonomy (e.g., vegetables, four-footed animals) (see Wu &
Barsalou, 2009).  Because items on a list activate not only their own memory representations but
also the representations of other, related concepts stored in one’s knowledge base, errors of
remembering can occur when output is not, or cannot be, properly edited or screened.
           According to AAT, there are two factors that drive increases in false memory
illusions with age.  First, children’s knowledge base not only changes in terms of the
number of concepts it contains, but as new concepts are added (e.g., superordinate
constructs), this knowledge base also gets reorganized to represent the effects of
learning and experience (e.g., Bjorklund, 1987, 2005).  Indeed, when word lists are
created that are consistent with children’s word associations rather than with adults’ word
associations, developmental differences in false memory rates are attenuated (Anastasi
& Rhodes, 2008; Carneiro, Albuquerque, Fernandez, & Esteves, 2007; Metzger et al.,
2008).  However, despite this attenuation, age differences are not eliminated.  This is
because, according to AAT, there is a second factor driving memory development,
namely automaticity.  Specifically, across a number of cognitive tasks (e.g., verbal
memory, visual search, mental rotation, mental addition) children’s performance get
faster and more efficient (e.g., Kail, 1988, 1997; Kail & Park, 1994).  Thus, it is not just
the content and structure of children’s developing knowledge base that drives increases
in their susceptibility to false memory illusions but also changes in the speed with which
they can access and activate concepts and their associations in that knowledge base.
           Although both FTT and AAT agree that changes in knowledge base are key to
understanding increases in children’s spontaneous false memories with age, only AAT
contains the additional assumptions about changes in automaticity and speed of
processing.  Recent research on the development of automaticity has confirmed AAT’s
predictions concerning the importance of automaticity when explaining changes in
children’s true and false memories (Howe, 2005; Wimmer & Howe, 2009).  For example,
using a modified free association task with 5-, 7-, and 11-year-olds, Wimmer and Howe
(2009) demonstrated that children, like adults, can and do generate false memories
automatically at encoding.  Importantly, they showed that not only do the types of
associations change with age (indicating growth and restructuring of children’s
knowledge base) but also that the speed with which these memories were activated
increased with age.  This finding is consistent with the assumption that increases in the
automaticity with which associations are accessed and activated in children’s knowledge
base are correlated with increases in children’s false memories.
           Interestingly, although children generate false memories relatively automatically
during encoding, there is evidence that they are not necessarily produced automatically
during retrieval.  To illustrate, consider a study in which participants are presented with
either a single DRM list (control condition) or two DRM lists in succession.  Interposed
between the lists are instructions that ask participants to continue remembering the first
list while studying the second one (a directed remembering instruction) or to forget the
first list, as it was simply a practice list, and to remember only the second list (a directed
forgetting instruction).  Using this directed forgetting procedure with DRM lists, Howe
(2005) found that children, like adults (Kimball & Bjork, 2002), could inhibit the output of
presented words relative to participants in the control or directed remembering
conditions.  However, unlike adults whose false memory rates remained unchanged
relative to the control and directed remembering conditions, children were also able to
inhibit the output of false memories.  According to Kimball and Bjork (2002), adults can
inhibit the output of actually presented information (information that is in episodic
memory) but cannot inhibit false memories because they are automatically activated in
semantic memory and do not become part of the episodic list.  Howe (2005) argued that
for children, although false memories may be generated automatically, they become part
of their episodic experience (something that they may become consciously aware of) and
hence can be suppressed at output.  Thus, not only does automaticity of children’s false
memories increase in speed during the encoding or generation phase (Wimmer & Howe,
2009), but so too does the automatic ability to access and output false memories during
retrieval. 
Because the DRM paradigm is so robust, it has become a very useful tool when trying to
understand the development of children’s spontaneous false memories.  Indeed, a recent
investigation of the effects of maltreatment experiences on memory has focused on the DRM
paradigm to examine true and false memories (for reviews, see Howe et al., 2006a, 2006b).  In an
early study, Howe, Cicchetti, Toth, and Cerrito (2004) examined the memory performances of
three groups of children on the DRM task: nonmaltreated children from middle-socioeconomic
(SES) backgrounds, nonmaltreated children from low-SES families, and maltreated low-SES
children.  Howe et al. (2004) found the same pattern of results regardless of maltreatment status.
Specifically, both maltreated and nonmaltreated children exhibited similar patterns of false
recognition and recall.  Similarly, in an examination of the neurobehavioral sequelae of child
sexual abuse, Porter, Lawson, and Bigler (2005) found no significant differences in memory
function between abused and nonabused children, despite elevations in psychopathology and
diminished performance on measures of attention and executive function for the abused group.
The present research extends these efforts to understand the nature of any
changes in basic memory processes as a consequence of child maltreatment by
addressing two important questions.  The first is whether the stress associated with
childhood maltreatment makes maltreated children more susceptible to memory errors
(e.g., false memories) for emotionally arousing information than nonmaltreated children and to
ascertain whether increased susceptibility may be related to the presence of dissociative
symptoms.  Although recent studies have shown that false recollection rates generally increase
with age throughout childhood and that these developmental trends are similar for maltreated and
nonmaltreated children alike (Howe et al., 2004), these conclusions are based on children’s
memories for neutral word lists.  There is evidence to indicate that maltreated children exhibit
hypervigilance when it comes to processing emotional stimuli, particularly negative or threatening
stimuli (e.g., Howe et al., 2006b; Pollak, 2003).  Indeed, maltreated children are quicker to
recognize angry facial expressions (Pollak & Kistler, 2002) and their arousal levels remain
elevated for longer periods of time by anger in background situations (Pollak, Vardi, Bechner, &
Curtin, 2005).  It is possible that it is only when negatively valenced stimuli are used that
differences in memory due to maltreatment will become apparent.  Differences in memory for
emotional stimuli are also important from a forensic perspective because the events maltreated
children are asked to recollect and testify about are frequently, if not always, emotional in nature.
It is critical, therefore, to determine whether differences between maltreated and nonmaltreated
children’s basic memory skills become apparent when the to-be-remembered material is
emotional or stress-related in nature.
           The second question concerns differences in maltreated and nonmaltreated
children’s ability to inhibit the output of true and false memories for both neutral and
emotional information.  As reviewed earlier, previous research has shown that children can
inhibit the output of true and false memories using a directed-forgetting paradigm (Howe, 2005),
but these results are also confined to neutral word lists and have only been examined with
nonmaltreated children.  Perhaps the stress associated with maltreatment alters children’s ability
to suppress the output of items from memory, particularly when those items are emotional in
nature.  Indeed, there is some evidence that patients suffering from acute stress disorder show
enhanced directed forgetting of emotional material (e.g., Moulds & Bryant, 2005).  Here,
traumatized participants (e.g., motor vehicle accidents, nonsexual assaults) who either developed
acute stress disorder or did not were compared to nontraumatized participants on their ability to
inhibit the output of word lists that contained positive, neutral, and trauma-related words.  Adult
participants were presented with a list of words and then some were instructed to forget that list
and to remember only the second list presented following the directed forgetting instruction.  The
results showed that traumatized participants who developed acute stress disorder had poorer
memory for the trauma-related words, especially in the directed forgetting condition.  Thus, acute
stress disorder that accompanies trauma is associated with greater inhibition of trauma-related
concepts.
           On the other hand, those suffering major depressive disorders show an enhanced
sensitivity to emotional stimuli and a reduced ability to inhibit such material at output (e.g.,
Power, Dalgleish, Claudio, Tata, & Kentish, 2000).  Here, participants suffering from depression
and those who were not were presented word lists containing both positive and negative items.
When some of the participants in each group were instructed to forget previously studied lists,
those in the depressed group had greater difficulty inhibiting the output of negative words than
nondepressed participants.  Thus, depression-relevant information is more difficult to inhibit when
depressed than other neutral or positive information.
           In the current experiment, we examined maltreated and nonmaltreated children’s
ability to forget true and false memories that arise from studying DRM lists that were
either neutral or emotional (negatively valenced).  Our first hypothesis concerned
whether differences would arise in maltreated and nonmaltreated children’s true and
false recall when emotional rather than neutral material serves as the to-be-remembered
information.  There is now considerable evidence that for recall (but not recognition),
nonmaltreated children exhibit greater true and false recall for neutral than negative
information (see Howe, 2007; Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, & Wimmer, in press).
However, if maltreated children are more hypervigilant for negative and threatening
information, then their true and false recall of emotional words may be greater than for
neutral words, an effect that is the reverse of that typically exhibited by nonmaltreated
children.
           Our second hypothesis focused on differences in maltreated and nonmaltreated
children’s ability to inhibit emotional and neutral true and false memories.  Here, if
maltreated children behave in a manner similar to adults suffering from acute stress
disorder, then they should exhibit higher rates of inhibition for emotional than neutral
memories whereas no differences will be observed for nonmaltreated children.
Alternatively, if maltreated children behave in a manner consistent with clinically
depressed adults, then they should exhibit a reduced ability to inhibit emotional
memories relative to neutral ones and than that of nonmaltreated children.  In all cases,
the pattern for the inhibition of true recall should parallel that for false recall given that
both maltreated and nonmaltreated children exhibit reduced automaticity in processing
false memories at retrieval as that found previously for typically developing children
(Howe, 2005).
Method
Participants
A total of 284 children (55% male) distributed between maltreated (N = 141) and
nonmaltreated (N = 143) groups participated in this study.  Participants were further divided into
two age groups, 136 6- to 9-year-olds (M = 8.23, SD = 1.08) and 148 10- to 12-year-olds (M =
11.12, SD = 0.78).  This age division was selected because the literature on spontaneous false
memory effects shows that children’s susceptibility to this memory illusion differs maximally
between these age ranges (for a review, see Brainerd et al., 2008a).  Families were primarily of
lower socioeconomic status (SES).  Average income for families of the children in the sample was
$21,800 (SD = $11,496), with 24.4% of the sample reporting household income below $14,000.
When taking into account the number of children in the family, average income per person was
$5,141 (SD = $2,836). The sample was ethnically diverse and predominantly of minority race,
including African American (63.4%), European American (25.4%), and other racial groups
(11.3%); 16.9% of the children were of Hispanic ethnicity.   The children in the study resided in a
large Northeastern US city.  The demographics of study participants are comparable to those of
children typically reported to authorities for child maltreatment in urban settings and consistent
with prior research with respect to socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and the co-occurrence of
multiple subtypes of abuse (Bolger & Patterson, 2001; Howe et al., 2006a, 2006b; Valentino et
al., 2008; Valentino et al., 2009).  Information on the specific types of maltreatment experienced
are described below.
Comparisons among demographic variables revealed minimal differences between the
nonmaltreated and the maltreated participants (see Table 1).  Child gender across the two groups
was evenly distributed, with 64 nonmaltreated females and 65 maltreated females, as well as 79
nonmaltreated males and 76 maltreated males, (2(1, N = 284) = .05, p > .05.  For child age,
maltreated (M = 9.85, SD = 1.71) and nonmaltreated (M = 9.64, SD = 1.74) children did not
significantly differ, t (282) = 1.07, p > .05.  There were also no significant differences between the
groups on mother’s age, t(263) = .73, p > .05, and family income, t(277) = 1.32, p > .05.
Additionally, there were no significant group differences based on race, (2(2, N = 284) = 2.70, p >
.05, or ethnicity, (2(1, N = 284) = 3.41, p > .05, or percentage of families receiving public
assistance, (2(1, N = 284) = 2.65, p > .05.
           All parents provided informed consent for their child’s participation and for
examination of any Department of Human Services (DHS) records pertaining to
their family.  Teachers of target children also provided informed consent to
participate and child assent was obtained.  Families were recruited via the Department of Human
Services (DHS).  Records were accessed via the Monroe County computerized system.  Using a
date of birth query the system yielded the records of families who were receiving Public
Assistance (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families – TANF and Food Stamps) and had a child
within the desired age range.  Families then were randomly selected from the generated list to
further consider as potential participants.  The Monroe County computerized system was then
used to determine if the family had any Child Protective Service (CPS) records.  If the families
had no record of CPS involvement, then they were contacted as potential nonmaltreating
participants.  If a family had indicated reports pertaining to the target child, then the family would
be contacted as a potential maltreated participant.  If more than one child within the age range had
experienced maltreatment, then the target child was selected randomly.  Any families with
unfounded reports of maltreatment (e.g., those deemed to have insufficient evidence to
substantiate the occurrence of maltreatment) were not utilized given the unclear nature of their
backgrounds.
           The DHS records of families with indicated Child Protective Service (CPS) reports were
coded by raters using the Maltreatment Classification System (MCS; Barnett, Manly, & Cicchetti,
1993).  The MCS allows the history of maltreatment experiences to be based on multiple
informants.  Informants could include caregivers, CPS workers, neighbors, or other community
members such as physicians, teachers, or daycare providers.  The records were coded by trained
research assistants and clinical psychologists who had been approved as reliable coders on a
standard set of records.  Acceptable levels of reliability were obtained for the current sample.
Kappas between pairs of raters ranged from .77 to 1.0 for the presence of physical abuse, 1.0 for
sexual abuse, .77 to 1.0 for neglect, and .72 to 1.0 for emotional maltreatment.  Other
investigators have demonstrated that the MCS is reliable and valid in classifying maltreatment,
including emotional maltreatment, physical neglect, physical abuse, and sexual abuse (Bolger,
Patterson, & Kupersmidt, 1998; English et al., 2005; Manly, 2005; Manly, Cicchetti, & Barnett,
1994; Manly et al., 2001; Smith & Thornberry, 1995).  Subtypes of maltreatment were coded in
accord with operational definitions contained in the MCS (Manly et al., 1994).  Neglect was coded
if records revealed a failure to provide for the child’s basic physical needs for adequate food,
clothing, shelter, and medical treatment.  In addition to inadequate attention to physical needs,
forms of this subtype include lack of supervision, moral-legal neglect, and educational neglect.
Examples of typical neglect incidents included leaving young children alone, failing to seek
appropriate medical care, maintaining unsanitary living conditions, and providing inadequate
nourishment.  Emotional maltreatment was coded when extreme thwarting of children’s basic
emotional needs for psychological safety and security, acceptance and self-esteem, and age-
appropriate autonomy were present.  Examples of emotional maltreatment include belittling and
ridiculing the child, extreme negativity and hostility, exposure to severe marital violence,
abandoning the child, and suicidal or homicidal threats in the child’s presence. Physical
abuse was coded for instances of the non-accidental infliction of physical injury on the child (e.g.,
bruises, welts, burns, choking, broken bones).  Injuries range from minor and temporary to
permanently disfiguring.  Finally, sexual abuse was coded when attempted or actual sexual
contact between the child and a family member or person caring for the child for purposes of that
person’s sexual satisfaction or financial benefit occurred.  Events range from exposure to
pornography or adult sexual activity, to sexual touching and fondling, to forced intercourse with
the child.
In the current sample, the majority of maltreated children (58.1%) experienced more than
one subtype of maltreatment.  Thus, co-occurrence of maltreatment subtypes was frequent.
Overall, 75.2% of the sample experienced neglect, 55.3% experienced emotional maltreatment,
26.2% were physically abused, and 2.8% were sexually abused.  Because of the overlap of
maltreatment subtypes in our sample, and because of the number of between-subjects cells needed
to satisfy design requirements, we did not conduct subtype analyses on maltreated children’s
memory performance.
Procedure
            The design of this study conformed to a 2(Age: 6- to 9-year-olds, 10- to 12-year-olds) x
2(Maltreatment status: maltreated, nonmaltreated) x 2(Valence: neutral, emotional) x 3(Interlist
Cue: Remember, Forget, Control) x 2(List Study Position: 1st vs. 2nd) x 2(Item: true, false) mixed
analysis of variance (ANOVA) where the first 4 factors were between-participants and the last 2
factors were within-participant.  Study procedures were completed during two visits: One with the
mother and one with the mother and child.  During the initial visit, mothers of potential
participants gave informed consent for their child’s participation, signed a DHS release allowing
project staff to review their DHS records, signed a consent permitting project staff to contact the
target child’s teacher, and completed the demographics interview.  During the second visit
children met with a member of the project staff to complete the cognitive assessment and the
DRM paradigm and their mothers completed the MMCI.
Measures
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – IV (WISC-IV; Wechsler, 2003)
and Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence - III (WPPSI-III
Wechsler, 2002).  In order to obtain an assessment of cognitive functioning, children also
completed the Verbal (Similarities, Vocabulary, Comprehension) and Perceptual (Block Design,
Picture Concepts, Matrix Reasoning) subtests of the WISC-IV (Wechsler, 2003) or WPPSI-III
(Wechsler, 2002), depending on their age.    
Maternal Maltreatment Classification Interview (MMCI; Cicchetti, Toth, & Manly, 2002).
In order to supplement information obtained from CPS records, mothers also completed the
MMCI.  Mothers were interviewed about experiences in their child’s life that could have been
more difficult for their child to cope with.  Questions were framed to assess exposure to possible
maltreatment without directly inquiring as to whether the child had been maltreated (i.e., “Has
your child ever been home or in a situation where extremely angry interactions or violence have
taken place?”), with specific follow-up queries designed to gather further information on the
incident (i.e.: “How old was the child when this occurred?”, “What led to the situation?”).  If a
mother who had been recruited as a nonmaltreating comparison family disclosed an event that
qualified as maltreatment, then the family was disqualified from the study.
Child Dissociative Checklist (CDC; Putnam, Helmers, & Trickett, 1993). Teachers of
study participants were asked to complete the CDC. The CDC documents observed behaviors
related to dissociation.  Behaviors are rated on a zero-to-two scale (i.e.: “child has intense
outbursts of anger, often without apparent cause and may display unusual physical strength during
these episodes”, “child shows rapid regressions in age-level of behavior”).   On average teachers
had known the participants for nine months when they completed the CDC.  
            Deese/Roediger-McDermott Paradigm.  A modified version of the DRM paradigm was
utilized to include words that were affectively laden.  Children were interviewed individually and
listened to a recording of one or two of eight possible DRM lists.  Four word lists consisted of non-
emotional words (e.g., door, awake, apple, table) and four consisted of emotional words (e.g.,
bomb, rape, heroin, hate) (all of the lists are shown in the Appendix).  The majority of these lists
have been used before with adults (Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1999) and with children
ranging from ages 5 to 12 years old (Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2004; Howe et al., in press).
Independent evaluation of the words on these lists also confirmed that children in these
populations and ages were familiar with these words inasmuch as they are often seen in their
vocabulary and children frequently used “street slang” for some of the terms we presented (see
Appendix).  Although we did not directly control for the effects of word familiarity, concreteness,
and meaningfulness across list valence, because there was no main effect for valence (see Results)
any differences in these variables (or other factors potentially confounded with valence) did not
affect children’s true and false memory performance in this study.
           List pairings were selected such that associations between them were minimized.  This
was done in order to reduce (or eliminate) across-list cuing, something that could have negative
effects on the directed forgetting manipulation (Conway, Harries, Noyes, Racsma’ny, & Frankish,
2000).  Each list consisted of 10 words; the words were presented in two-second intervals and
narrated by the experimenter.  Children were given general memory instructions indicating that
they were to try to remember the concepts presented on the list.  After the presentation of the last
item in the first list, children in the remember condition were told to continue remembering the
concepts they just heard and to try to remember the items presented on the next (second) list.
Children in the forget condition were told that the first list had just been a practice list so they
should forget it and that they should remember the next (second) list as this would be the one they
would be tested on later.  Following presentation of the second list, children were instructed to
recall items from a specified list, either List 1 or 2 (recall order was counterbalanced across
children).  After recall of that list was completed, they were asked to recall items from the other
list.  Children in the control condition received only one list, either in the List 1 or List 2 study
position.  In lieu of seeing the other list, they circled pairs of letters and in lieu of an interlist cue
they received instruction regarding the second task.  With these exceptions, the procedure was the
same for the control children as for the children in the remember and forget conditions.
            Following recall, a recognition test was administered.  The results of the recognition
testing do not bear directly on the hypotheses examined in this article and serve mainly to validate
the recall findings.  This is because recall tests are the measure of choice when examining directed
forgetting with recognition tests being insensitive to directed forgetting manipulations (e.g.,
Kimball & Bjork, 2002). The only important point is that analyses of the recognition data
indicated no differences in recognition performance (or A( scores) as a function of instruction.
What this means is that children in this study did generate false memories across all of the
conditions in this experiment and hence any differences in recall due to instruction are real
differences due to inhibition of false memories that were generated during list presentation.
Results
            Ten children were excluded from the analyses because IQ data were not available.
Because each child contributed only one observation to the analysis of false recall data, we first
analyzed those data separately using chi-square analyses and the related weighted-least-squares
method.  Like Kimball and Bjork (2002), a separate analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded a
similar pattern of results.   Because this latter analysis revealed the same pattern of findings as the
nonparametric analyses, for ease of presentation and because we wanted to directly compare true
and false recall rates, the parametric analyses will be used throughout when comparing true and
false recall rates.  As well, because there were no effects due to counterbalancing variables (list-
pair topics and within-list-pair presentation order) or to gender, these variables were eliminated
from subsequent analyses.  We begin by presenting the initial analysis of covariance.  This is
followed by an examination of our hypotheses concerning the effects of age and maltreatment
status, interlist cuing, and interlist cuing and valence on children’s true and false memories.
Analysis of Covariance
            To test the main hypotheses associated with this study, the percentages of targets correctly
recalled and critical items falsely recalled were analyzed using a 2(Age: 6- to 9-year-olds, 10- to
12-year-olds) x 2(Maltreatment status: maltreated, nonmaltreated) x 2(Valence: neutral,
emotional) x 3(Interlist Cue: Remember, Forget, Control) x 2(List Study Position: 1st vs. 2nd) x
2(Item: true, false) mixed analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) where the first four factors were
between-participants, the last two factors were within-participant, and the four covariates were the
scores on the CDC, verbal IQ subscore, perceptual IQ subscore, and full-scale IQ.  The analyses
showed that one of the covariates, the verbal subscale of the IQ test, was significant, F(1, 249) =
36.25, p < .001, (p2 = .127.  Because of the strength of this effect, and because of its obvious link
to the DRM illusion, all analyses are conducted on the adjusted scores.  Adjusted percentages and
standard errors for true and false recall as a function of the main variables in this experiment (age,
maltreatment status, and valence) are shown in Table 2.
Effects of Maltreatment Status and Age on Children’s True and False Recall
            With verbal IQ controlled, the analyses revealed no main effects for maltreatment status
and no interactions involving maltreatment status as a variable.  Thus, like previous research using
the DRM paradigm (Howe et al., 2004), maltreated children do not differ from nonmaltreated
children in their susceptibility to spontaneous false memory illusions.  Also like this previous
research, there was a main effect for Age, F(1, 249) = 29.83, p < .001, (p2 = .32, where 6- to 9-
year-olds (16%) recalled less than the 10- to 12-year-olds (21%).  This was modified by an Age x
Item interaction, F(1, 249) = 28.18, p < .001, (p2 = .102, where post-hoc tests (p < .05) revealed
that older children’s true recall (41%) was better than younger children’s (31%), but there were no
age differences in false recall rates (13.5% and 12%).  Thus, there was no effect of maltreatment
status, older children correctly recalled more items than younger children, and there were no age
differences in false recall.
Effects of Interlist Cue on Children’s True and False Recall
            As predicted, there was a main effect for Interlist Cue, F(1, 249) = 5.47, p < .05, (p2 = .042,
where more items were recalled in the Control condition (21%) than either the Remember (18%)
or Forget (18%) conditions, which did not differ, a finding replicating that obtained by Howe
(2005).  More importantly, there was an Interlist Cue x List Study Position interaction, F(2, 249)
= 12.37, p < .001, (p2 = .09, where post-hoc tests (p < .05) revealed that there were no differences
between the Control and Remember conditions across the two different List Study Positions, but
there were significantly fewer items recalled in the Forget condition on List 1 than List 2.  These
effects are consistent with Howe’s (2002) finding that young children can inhibit recall when
instructed to do so and with previous findings using this paradigm with middle SES children
(Howe, 2005).  That is, the critical Interlist Cue x List Study Position interaction was reliable and
the primary differences were localized in the Forget condition such that recall was impaired.
Effects of Interlist Cue and Valence on Children’s Inhibition of True and False Memories
            There was no main effect for valence.  However, the Interlist Cue x List Study Position
interaction above was modified by an Interlist Cue x List Study Position x Item interaction which
in turn was modified by an Interlist Cue x List Study Position x Item x Valence interaction, F(2,
249) = 3.33, p < .05, (p2 = .026.  The mean (adjusted) percentages of targets correctly recalled
(Panel A) and critical items falsely recalled (Panel B) are shown Figure 1 for neutral lists and
Figure 2 for emotional lists.  As can be seen in these figures, and as was confirmed using post-hoc
analyses, there were three outcomes of primary interest.  First, like Howe (2005), children were
able to suppress the output of both true and false items for both neutral and emotional materials.
Second, when compared directly, true neutral items were more easily suppressed than emotional
items (compare Panel A across Figures 1 and 2).  That is, the magnitude of the decrease in true
recall in the Forget condition for List 1 for neutral material was greater in magnitude than that for
emotional material.  It would seem then that emotional items, while suppressed at output, were
harder to suppress than more mundane items.  Third, for false recall, although suppression was
evident for emotional items, the magnitude of this effect was considerably less than that for
neutral items (compare Panel B across Figures 1 and 2).  In fact, these suppression rates were even
lower than that observed for true recall.  However, this may be because of near floor effects in
false recall rates for emotional material. This finding may not be all that unusual, with lower false
recall rates for emotional material having been reported by Howe (2007) with middle SES
children as well as in other experiments with both adults and children (Brainerd, Stein, Silveira,
Rohenkohl, & Reyna, 2008b; Howe et al., in press).
Discussion and Conclusions
           In accord with previous research, no differences were found in the basic memory
processes of maltreated and nonmaltreated children, not for true recall or false recall.  Despite the
obvious statistical power in our study to detect such differences if they did exist (with the current
Ns, this power was 70% and higher), when verbal IQ was controlled, both maltreated and
nonmaltreated children were able to inhibit the output of true and false neutral information.  This
finding has been observed in an earlier study with nonmaltreated middle SES children (Howe,
2005).  The critical feature of the current research is that it extends this finding to maltreated
children and negatively valenced information.  Interestingly, although children, regardless of age
and maltreatment status, can inhibit the output of true and false emotional information, they do so
less effectively than when they try to inhibit neutral information.  Moreover, false recall rates for
emotional lists were considerably less than that for neutral ones, a finding that is typical in this
literature (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2008; Howe, 2007; Howe et al., in press).  It may be because of
these lower false recall rates that differences in children’s ability to inhibit false memories of
emotional material were not as strong as that observed for neutral information.
           In addition, the current research shows that the ability to inhibit the output of true and
false emotional information does not vary as a consequence of related psychopathology (e.g.,
dissociation, at least as measured by the CDC).  This hitherto unreported finding converges on
findings elsewhere in the literature where it has been shown that dissociation does not have a
deleterious effect on maltreated children’s susceptibility to misinformation.  In fact, the only
individual difference factor that was related to recall rates was verbal IQ.  This finding is not new
in the memory literature and is consistent with a number of previous studies (e.g., Dent, 1992).
           Together, these findings are important because they extend the domain of memory
similarity between maltreated and nonmaltreated children into the more ecologically valid arena
of emotional stimuli.  Moreover, these results clearly show that maltreated children do not exhibit
the same patterns as that of patients with acute stress disorder, namely, enhanced directed
forgetting of trauma-related words (e.g., Moulds & Bryant, 2005).  In fact, they, like
nonmaltreated children, were poorer at inhibiting true emotional stimuli than neutral stimuli.  Nor
do maltreated children exhibit the same pattern of findings as patients with depressive symptoms
(e.g., Power et al., 2000) – that is, maltreated children were not more sensitive to emotional
material as they were just as capable of inhibiting the output of emotional stimuli as
nonmaltreated children.  Although there are clear differences between the current study and those
conducted with traumatized or depressed adults, it would seem that like the majority of other
studies that have looked for differences in basic memory processes between maltreated and
nonmaltreated children, there are none to be found.  The important contribution of the current
research is that these are the first findings to demonstrate that this similarity in memory
processing extends to emotionally laden material.
           One exception to the lack of differences between memory in maltreated and
nonmaltreated children emerged in a recent investigation of incidental recall of stimuli
involving maternal-referent words (Valentino, Cicchetti, Rogosch, & Toth, 2008).  In that study,
abused children demonstrated deficits in recall compared to neglected and nonmaltreated children.
 In the current study, for the most part, the operation of maltreated children’s basic memory
processes has not been found to differ from that of other, nonmaltreated children when measured
using intentional recall and recognition measures (measures most often found in forensic
situations), regardless of the emotional nature of the information.  However, further work is
needed to ascertain whether the type of material (e.g., maternal-referent words) to be recalled may
differentially affect certain incidental recall processes in abused but not neglected children.
           Despite its contributions, the current investigation did not examine possible
differences due to psychopathology other than dissociative symptoms.  For example, it
may be important in future investigations to disentangle the possible effects associated
with depression or PTSD in maltreated children.  It is known that children with
maltreatment-related PTSD, particularly males, have a smaller corpus callosum (De Bellis et al.,
1999; Teicher, Ito, Glod, Andersen, Dumont, & Ackerman, 1997).  Maltreatment-related PTSD is
also associated with decreased cerebral volumes, attenuation of frontal lobe asymmetry, smaller
cerebral and frontal cortices, less prefrontal white matter, and reduced right temporal lobe
volumes (see Carrion et al., 2001; De Bellis et al., 2002).
           Curiously, despite this evidence that child maltreatment related PTSD can have
adverse consequences for neurological development, none of these studies found adverse effects
specific to neurological structures associated with memory.  Although smaller hippocampal
volumes that have been reported for adults with child maltreatment-related PTSD (e.g., Bremner
et al., 1997), similar findings have not been obtained in cross-sectional or short-term longitudinal
studies of pediatric maltreatment-related PTSD (e.g., De Bellis, Hall, Boring, Frustaci, & Moritz,
2001) and there has been the suggestion that hippocampal volumes might actually be larger in
pediatric PTSD (De Bellis, 2005).  Although this discrepancy might be accounted for because
there is a higher risk for alcohol and substance abuse in adolescence and adulthood (De Bellis,
2002), behaviors that are related to decreased hippocampal volume (e.g., De Bellis et al., 2000), it
may simply be that (a) the adverse effects of chronic stress do not manifest themselves in the
hippocampus until postpubertal development or (b) neurodevelopmental plasticity and normal
developmental increases in the hippocampus may obscure any adverse effects of maltreatment on
memory (for a review, see Bremner, 2008; Navalta et al., 2008).  Consistent with these
neurobiological findings, maltreated children in the current study showed more similarities than
differences in memory functioning when compared with children who have not experienced
maltreatment.  Moreover, maltreated children did not exhibit inhibition patterns similar to those
found for patients experiencing acute stress (Moulds & Bryant, 2005) or depression (Power et al.,
2000).
           Any future research aimed at disentangling psychopathological symptoms and
memory may also benefit from dissevering valence and arousal, especially as these two
components of emotion may have different effects on memory (Kensinger, 2009).
However, in studies where valence and arousal have been manipulated orthogonally,
valence (i.e., negative information) as manipulated in the current study, trumps arousal
when it comes to predicting elevations in false memory production (Brainerd et al., 2008).
 It is important to note that dissociative symptoms were rated by teachers.  Although
preferable to parent-report given possible reporting biases present in maltreating
caregivers, child self-report information would strengthen confidence in these findings.
Finally, because the presence of insecure attachment also has been related to memory
performance in both children and adults (cf. Alexander, Quas, & Goodman, 2002), and
because maltreated children are at heightened risk for insecure attachment, future
research on child maltreatment and memory processes also will benefit from attention to
relationship functioning.
           These caveats notwithstanding, the current investigation provides a critical and
unique extension to the extant literature on the effects of maltreatment on children’s
memory development.  Specifically, the absence of memory differences between
maltreated and nonmaltreated children now includes emotional content.  Moreover, it is
now clear that children, maltreated or not, can and do inhibit recall of both neutral and
negative information when necessary.   Thus, the current investigation contributes to the
emerging literature that the experience of child maltreatment does not adversely affect,
nor does it enhance, memory processes.
           This body of evidence is particularly important when it comes to understanding
maltreated children’s ability to testify about events in the courtroom.  Although the words
used in this study may not mirror the range of events children testify about in court, there
are some important similarities.  Indeed, children often have to talk about crimes they
have witnessed or been the target of, including sexual abuse (“rape” and our “crimes”
list).  Moreover, they often testify about drug abuse (our “drug” list), the use of weapons
(our “weapons” list), as well as their feelings associated with the events they have
experienced or witnessed (our “anger” list).  Although discussing entire events may be
different than remembering isolated words, there is some evidence that memory for lists
and for entire events behaves in a very similar manner, at least when it comes to issues
of valence and false memories (for a discussion, see Howe et al., in press).
           This growing body of evidence concerning memory and maltreatment is also
important for informing issues regarding the suggestibility of child victims’ memories and
it may affect decisions as to whether judges and lawyers are confident in relying on
children’s reports of abuse and neglect (cf. Toth & Valentino, 2009).  The results of the
current investigation also possess implications for forensic interviewing as they suggest
that children who have experienced abuse-related trauma are capable of accurately
reporting memories of their maltreatment, even when the memories are emotionally
laden.  Of course, as with any interviews with children, it is important to recognize that
leading questions can interfere with recall and that memory accuracy increases with child
age.  Utilization of structured interview protocols developed for forensic contexts are
integral to ensuring that interviewers do not inadvertently mislead children (Lamb,
Hershkowitz, Orbach, & Esplin, 2008).  As research on trauma and memory continues to
develop, it will be increasingly possible to address its implications for legal and social
policy arenas, particularly as this relates to the viability of child testimony in the
courtroom.
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Appendix
Emotional and Non-emotional Word Lists (critical lures in CAPITALS)
Non-emotional words
            HOUSE                       SLEEP                                    FRUIT                         CHAIR
           Door                         Bed                          Apple                       Table
           Garage                               Relax                        Vegetable                Sit
           Window                    Awake                                Orange                               Leg
           Brick                         Tired                        Pear                         Seat
           Building                    Dream                                Banana                               Couch
           Family                                 Blanket                    Berry                        Desk
           Boat                         Snore                       Cherry                                Recliner
           Chimney                  Nap                          Basket                                Cushion
           Street                       Pillow                       Bowl                         Swivel
           Key                          Yawn                        Salad                       Stool
Emotional words
            WEAPON                   CRIME                        DRUG                                    ANGER
           Gun*                           Robbery                       Marijuana**                Mad
           Knife                        Murder                                Cocaine***                  Fear
           Bomb                       Rape                        Heroin                                 Hate
           Fist                           Killing                       Alcohol                    Rage
           Rifle                         Drunk Driving                      Crack                       Temper
           Blood                       Jail                           Stoned                                Fury
           Death                       Arrest                       High                         Wrath
           Cut                           Court                        Needle                               Fight
           Scar                         Bars                         Snort                        Hatred
           Explode                    Handcuffs                Spoon                                 Mean
*Alternative terms accepted included: Gat
**Alternative terms accepted included: Weed, Pot
***Alternative terms accepted included: Coke
Table 1.
Demographic Characteristics.
___________________________________________________________________
                                            Maltreated               Nonmaltreated
                                            (N = 141)                       (N = 143)
___________________________________________________________________
                                            M (SD) or %               M (SD) or %
Gender (% male)                53.9 %                                 55.2 %
Age                                     9.86 (1.11)               9.64 (1.74)
Maternal Age                      33.78 (6.13)             33.24 (6.03)
Race
  African-American                          58.9 %                         67.8 %
  Caucasian                         27.7                         23.1
  Other                                             13.5                             9.1
  Latino Ethnicity                 12.8 %                         21.0 %
Current Public Assistance              93.6 %                         87.9 % 
Family Income                        $21,108 ($11,696)       $22,576 ($11,283)
___________________________________________________________________
Table 2.
Adjusted Mean Percentages (standard errors) of True and False Recall as a Function of Age,
Maltreatment Status, and Valence.
                                 Maltreated Children                                            Nonmaltreated
Children
                                               Valence
Valence
Age                          Neutral                     Emotional                                      Neutral
Emotional
6-9 years
           True              32.3 (2.5)                 31.7 (2.4)                                       31.4 (2.6)
30.2 (2.4)
           False             16.8 (1.5)                 10.7 (1.4)                                       15.6 (1.4)
10.7 (1.2)
10-12 years
           True              39.8 (2.4)                 41.8 (2.2)                                       42.0 (2.1)
40.5 (2.4)
           False             15.2 (0.5)                 10.3 (0.4)                                       14.3 (0.4)
  9.5 (0.5)
Figure 1. Children’s True and False Recall for Neutral Material (with standard error bars).
Figure 2.  Children’s True and False Recall for Emotional Material (with standard error bars).
